Abstract

Kant claims that the transcendental self can be represented as a “feeling of existence” (Gefühl eines Daseins). Some interpreters take this claim to be inconsistent with Kant’s larger theory of self-consciousness. I consider the extent to which two eighteenth-century philosophy texts that Kant knew well - Tetens’ Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung and Feder’s Logik und Metaphysik - can contribute to our understanding of Gefühl eines Daseins. I point to some continuities between Kant’s characterization of “Gefühl” in Gefühl eines Daseins, and Tetens’ and Feder’s conceptualizations of Selbstgefühl. I show that Gefühl eines Daseins is prima facie consistent with Feder’s clear “I” (or Selbstgefühl) and Tetens’ clear Selbstgefühl; and both Gefühl eines Daseins and clear Selbstgefühl relate to higher cognition. Finally, I discuss whether the notion of Selbstgefühl is compatible with key aspects of Kant’s conceptualization of the self - the transcendental-empirical distinction, and the atemporality of the self.