Compassion without Cognitivism

Humana Mente 12 (35) (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Compassion is generally thought to be a morally valuable emotion both because it is concerned with the suffering of others and because it prompts us to take action to their behalf. But skeptics are unconvinced. Not only does a viable account of compassion’s evaluative content—its characteristic concern—appear elusive, but the emotional response itself seems deeply parochial: a concern we tend to feel toward the suffering of friends and loved ones, rather than for individuals who are outside of our circle of intimates. In response, I defend a sophisticated, non-cognitivist account of compassion and explain how it avoids the difficulties that undermine other proposals.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-03-26
Latest version: 2 (2019-09-17)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
On Virtue Ethics.Hursthouse, Rosalind
Upheavals of Thought.Nussbaum, Martha

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
122 ( #29,252 of 48,822 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #16,036 of 48,822 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.