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  1. added 2018-12-14
    What Sentimentalists Should Say About Emotions.Charlie Kurth - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multi-level structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work—for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra the rationalist criticisms of May 2018, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.
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  2. added 2018-11-06
    On Affect: Function and Phenomenology.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Humana Mente 11 (34):155-184.
    This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity—an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can be overcome.
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  3. added 2018-04-24
    What Can Information Encapsulation Tell Us About Emotional Rationality?Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Palgrave Macmillan.
    What can features of cognitive architecture, e.g. the information encapsulation of certain emotion processing systems, tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa proposes the following hypothesis: “the role of emotions is to supply the insufficiency of reason by imitating the encapsulation of perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Very roughly, emotion processing can sometimes occur in a way that is insensitive to what an agent already knows, and such processing can assist reasoning by restricting the response-options she considers. This paper (...)
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  4. added 2018-03-17
    An Evolutionary Psychology Model of Ego, Risk, and Cognitive Dissonance.Baruch Feldman - manuscript
    I propose a novel model of the human ego (which I define as the tendency to measure one’s value based on extrinsic success rather than intrinsic aptitude or ability). I further propose the conjecture that ego so defined both is a non-adaptive by-product of evolutionary pressures, and has some evolutionary value as an adaptation (protecting self-interest). I explore ramifications of this model, including how it mediates individuals’ reactions to perceived and actual limits of their power, their ability to cope with (...)
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  5. added 2017-09-14
    Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...)
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  6. added 2016-12-08
    Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love.Hichem Naar - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):197-214.
    Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes (...)
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  7. added 2016-10-18
    The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined.Isaac Wiegman - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):490-510.
    Recent empirical work suggests that emotions are responsible for anti-consequentialist intuitions. For instance, anger places value on actions of revenge and retribution, value not derived from the consequences of these actions. As a result, it contributes to the development of retributive intuitions. I argue that if anger evolved to produce these retributive intuitions because of their biological consequences, then these intuitions are not a good indicator that punishment has value apart from its consequences. This severs the evidential connection between retributive (...)
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  8. added 2016-03-25
    Controlling the Passions: Passion, Memory, and the Moral Physiology of Self in Seventeenth-Century Neurophilosophy.John Sutton - 1998 - In S. Gaukroger (ed.), The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century. Routledge. pp. 115-146.
    Some natural philosophers in the 17th century believed that they could control their own innards, specifically the animal spirits coursing incessantly through brain and nerves, in order to discipline or harness passion, cognition and action under rational guidance. This chapter addresses the mechanisms thought necessary after Eden for controlling the physiology of passion. The tragedy of human embedding in the body, with its cognitive and moral limitations, was paired with a sense of our confinement in sequential time. I use two (...)
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  9. added 2015-12-01
    Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):930-942.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...)
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  10. added 2015-11-05
    Anxiety, Normative Uncertainty, and Social Regulation.Charlie Kurth - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (1):1-21.
    Emotion plays an important role in securing social stability. But while emotions like fear, anger, and guilt have received much attention in this context, little work has been done to understand the role that anxiety plays. That’s unfortunate. I argue that a particular form of anxiety—what I call ‘practical anxiety’—plays an important, but as of yet unrecognized, role in norm-based social regulation. More specifically, it provides a valuable form of metacognition, one that contributes to social stability by helping individuals negotiate (...)
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  11. added 2015-10-01
    Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  12. added 2015-09-18
    How Do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making?Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist - 2015 - Emotion Review 7 (1):81-89.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
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  13. added 2015-05-08
    Le paradoxe de la fiction: le retour.Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - L'expression des Émotions: Mélanges En l'Honneur de Patrizia Lombardo.
    Tullmann et Buckwalter (2014) ont récemment soutenu que le paradoxe de la fiction tenait plus de l’illusion que de la réalité. D’après eux, les théories contemporaines des émotions ne fourniraient aucune raison d’adopter une interprétation du terme « existence » qui rende les prémisses du paradoxe incompatibles entre elles. Notre discussion a pour but de contester cette manière de dissoudre le paradoxe de la fiction en montrant qu’il ne prend pas sa source dans les théories contemporaines des émotions. Bien plutôt, (...)
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  14. added 2015-04-01
    La vertu.Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - In Emma Dayer-Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Dictionnaire des valeurs. Edition d’Ithaque.
    I argue on the basis of a discussion of Aristotelian and Humean accounts of virtue that virtue is fundamentally a disposition to undergo appropriate emotions.
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  15. added 2014-12-17
    Emotion und Verstand.Andreas Dorschel - 1999 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1):18-40.
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  16. added 2014-11-14
    Emotions: Philosophical Issues About.Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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  17. added 2014-04-15
    In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  18. added 2014-03-18
    Introduction: Modularity and the Nature of Emotions.Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S).
    In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the main concepts of modularity that have been offered in recent literature. After this, we turn to a summary of the papers collected in this volume. Our primary aim is to explain how the modularity of emotion question relates to traditional debates in emotion theory.
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  19. added 2013-11-11
    Leibniz and the Amour Pur Controversy.Markku Roinila - 2013 - Journal of Early Modern Studies 2 (2):35-55.
    The topic of disinterested love became fashionable in 1697 due to the famous amour pur dispute between Fénelon (1651-1715) and Bossuet (1627-1704). It soon attracted the attention of Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-1714) and she asked for an opinion about the dispute from her trusted friend and correspondent, the Hanoverian councilor Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). This gave Leibniz an opportunity to present his views on the matter, which he had developed earlier in his career (for example, in Elementa juris naturalis (...)
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  20. added 2012-10-03
    Emotion and Understanding.C. Z. Elgin - 2008 - In G. Brun, U. Dogluoglu & D. Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions.
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  21. added 2012-09-12
    Reasons to Feel, Reasons to Take Pills.Guy Kahane - 2011 - In J. Savulescu, R. ter Meulen & G. Kahane (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  22. added 2012-01-21
    Easy's Gettin' Harder All the Time: The Computational Theory and Affective States.Jason L. Megill & Jon Cogburn - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):306-316.
    We argue that A. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don’t generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. We are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between easy and hard problems (...)
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  23. added 2011-07-07
    Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition.Wayne Christensen & John Sutton - 2012 - In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. pp. 327-347.
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in (...)
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  24. added 2011-07-06
    Cognitive Pleasure and Distress.Irwin Goldstein - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  25. added 2010-01-12
    Emotions, Perceptions, and Emotional Illusions.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 207-24.
    Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...)
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