There is no general AI: Why Turing machines cannot pass the Turing test

arXiv (2019)
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Abstract
Since 1950, when Alan Turing proposed what has since come to be called the Turing test, the ability of a machine to pass this test has established itself as the primary hallmark of general AI. To pass the test, a machine would have to be able to engage in dialogue in such a way that a human interrogator could not distinguish its behaviour from that of a human being. AI researchers have attempted to build machines that could meet this requirement, but they have so far failed. To pass the test, a machine would have to meet two conditions: (i) react appropriately to the variance in human dialogue and (ii) display a human-like personality and intentions. We argue, first, that it is for mathematical reasons impossible to program a machine which can master the enormously complex and constantly evolving pattern of variance which human dialogues contain. And second, that we do not know how to make machines that possess personality and intentions of the sort we find in humans. Since a Turing machine cannot master human dialogue behaviour, we conclude that a Turing machine also cannot possess what is called “general” Artificial Intelligence. We do, however, acknowledge the potential of Turing machines to master dialogue behaviour in highly restricted contexts, where what is called “narrow” AI can still be of considerable utility.
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Archival date: 2019-06-14
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Meaning.Grice, H. Paul
Building Ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology.Arp, Robert; Smith, Barry & Spear, Andrew D.

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