What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of ‘imagining’ at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic memory is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend a factive (or “causalist”) view of remembering in order to hold that causal connections to past experiences are essential to how rememberings are typed; and, second, current theories that equate remembering with imagining are in fact consistent with a functionalist theory that includes causal connections in its account of what it is to remember. This suggests that remembering is not a kind of imagining and clarifies what it would take to establish the contrary.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LANWSO-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-08-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-08-13

Total views
153 ( #34,344 of 2,439,598 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #14,736 of 2,439,598 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.