Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts

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Abstract
Are words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism from Jennifer Saul that Esa Diaz-Leon develops doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political practices concerning our uses of these words. I then float the view that terms like 'woman' or 'man' are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology.
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First archival date: 2019-03-22
Latest version: 3 (2019-09-24)
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References found in this work BETA
Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender.Robin Dembroff - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
He/She/They/Ze.Dembroff, Robin & Wodak, Daniel

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2019-03-22

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