View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

7 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2018-07-17
    Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
    I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-03-11
    Conceptos de sustancias y conceptos de propiedades en animales no humanos.Laura Danón - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):27-54.
    El presente trabajo tiene dos objetivos centrales. Primero caracterizaré una variante de pragmatismo conceptual según la cual algunos conceptos deben entenderse como habilidades para identificar sustancias e identificar propiedades del entorno, y mostraré que quien cuenta con esas dos habilidades satisface, en grados diversos en cada caso, distintos requisitos centrales para la posesión de conceptos. Posteriormente defenderé la viabilidad de extender este enfoque a los animales no humanos, apelando a evidencia empírica que indica que distintas especies son capaces de identificar (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2017-02-16
    On the Triplet Frame for Concept Analysis.Vladimir Kuznetsov - 1999 - Theoria 14 (1):39-62.
    The paper has two objectives: to introduce the fundamentals of a triplet model of a concept, and to show that the main concept models may be structurally treated as its partial cases. The triplet model considers a concept as a mental representation and characterizes it from three interrelated perspectives. The first deals with objects (and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The second focuses on representing structures that depict objects and their attributes in some intelligent system. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2016-05-11
    Deferential Concepts: A Response to Woodfield.François Recanati - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):452–464.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2014-01-16
    'Conceptos. Revista de investigación graciana'. [REVIEW]María G. Navarro - 2009 - Devenires 20:181-185.
    Una empresa de inspiración graciana no puede por menos que hacer suya la consigna de que el mejor atajo para ser persona consiste en saberse ladear.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2010-12-10
    Mark Wilson, Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behaviour. [REVIEW]Nikolay Milkov - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (1):188-195.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2010-11-13
    Innateness.Steven Gross & Georges Rey - forthcoming - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
    A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark