Ethical value

In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell (2009)
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Abstract

Philosophical reflection on ethical value may be motivated in a number of ways. One common origin can occur when we observe that we often do not agree with people around us in their ethical commitments, and begin to puzzle how to make sense of that fact. Most of us have some strong beliefs as to ways our world can be a morally better or worse place: we agree for instance that the world is a better place for having less slavery in it than it used to. That is to say, we think slavery is a bad — a morally bad — thing. Similarly, most of us agree that the world is better off for our being in time to grab a small child out of the path of a speeding automobile than it would be if we came a moment too late. Saving a child from death or grave harm is a good — morally good — thing. The idea that the world includes ethical values like the goodness and badness of such things seems unproblematic when we focus on issue on which most of us agree. Yet our confidence that the world contains such values wobbles when we turn our attention to more controversial issues.

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Mark LeBar
Florida State University

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