Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice

Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features typical of partial relationships make phenomena like epistemic injustice easier to mask, more difficult to identify, and harder to correct.
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Archival date: 2022-01-08
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