The Lottery Paradox, the No-Justification Account, and Taiwan

Episteme:1-20 (forthcoming)
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To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding that the no-justification account implies that people living in Taiwan typically suffer from the Harman-style skepticism.
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Archival date: 2022-05-12
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