Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence?

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Abstract
This is part of an authors meets critics session on Daniel Star's wonderful book, Knowing Better. I discuss a potential problem with Kearns and Star's Reasons as Evidence thesis. The issue has to do with the difficulties we face is we treat normative reasons as evidence and impose no possession conditions on evidence. On such a view, it's hard to see how practical reasoning could be a non-monotonic process. One way out of the difficulty would be to allow for (potent) unpossessed reasons but insist that all evidence is possessed evidence. This option, I argue, isn't open to proponents of the Reasons as Evidence thesis. Instead, it seems that they'll have to say that all normative reasons are identified with pieces of possessed evidence. This requires the proponents of the Reasons as Evidence thesis to impose epistemic constraints on norms that some of us find objectionable.
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First archival date: 2016-06-19
Latest version: 1 (2017-02-27)
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References found in this work BETA
The Domain of Reasons.Skorupski, John
Reasons as Evidence.Kearns, Stephen & Star, Daniel
The Norm of Belief.Gibbons, John

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2016-06-19

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