Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths

In Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer Verlag (2018)
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Abstract
According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If some thinker with the same type of evidential support has a path that they can take, so do you. The paths exist because of the evidence you possess and the support it provides. Evidential support grounds propositional justification. The principle is mistaken. There are permissible steps you may take that others may not even if you have the very same evidence. There are permissible steps that you cannot take that others can even if your beliefs receive the same type of evidential support. Because we have to assume almost nothing about the nature of evidential support to establish these results, we should reject evidentialism.
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Archival date: 2017-06-26
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Mind and World.Price, Huw & McDowell, John
Mind and World.Mcdowell, John
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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