XV—The Russellian Retreat

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320 (2013)
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Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly deny that a truth norm is among the norms that govern belief. What we should not say is that the truth norm is the fundamental epistemic norm. In this paper, I shall argue that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the truth norm has a derivative status. Only a knowledge‐first approach to epistemic normativity can explain why epistemic assessment has its inward‐looking focus.
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Without Justification.Sutton, Jonathan
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.

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