Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties

In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative properties as such. The resulting epistemological status of evaluative property attributions is very much like it would be if we literally perceived such properties.

Author's Profile

Jack Lyons
University of Glasgow


Added to PP

507 (#22,154)

6 months
90 (#17,323)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?