Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties

In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative properties as such. The resulting epistemological status of evaluative property attributions is very much like it would be if we literally perceived such properties.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-07-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total downloads
112 ( #19,789 of 37,113 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #20,808 of 37,113 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.