Co-operative solutions to the prisoner's dilemma

Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321 (1991)
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Abstract

For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" preferences. But there are preferences which it maximizes to adopt and co-operate from.

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Duncan MacIntosh
Dalhousie University

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