Non-Inferential Transitions: Imagery and Association

In Timothy Chan & Anders Nes (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. New York, NY, USA: (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Unconscious logical inference seems to rely on the syntactic structures of mental representations (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018). Other transitions, such as transitions using iconic representations and associative transitions, are harder to assimilate to syntax-based theories. Here we tackle these difficulties head on in the interest of a fuller taxonomy of mental transitions. Along the way we discuss how icons can be compositional without having constituent structure, and expand and defend the “symmetry condition” on Associationism (the idea that associative links and transitions are perfectly symmetric). In the end, we show how a BIT (“bare inferential transition”) theory can cohabitate with these other non-inferential mental transitions.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-10-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
98 ( #33,561 of 50,217 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #14,033 of 50,217 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.