Public Reason Can Be Reasonably Rejected

Social Theory and Practice 43 (2):343-367 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important implications for the debate on public reason.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-09-23
Latest version: 5 (2017-03-25)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
1,004 ( #4,850 of 64,083 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #13,638 of 64,083 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.