Qualia, space, and control

Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space.

Author's Profile

Pete Mandik
William Paterson University of New Jersey

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
252 (#54,581)

6 months
45 (#77,509)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?