Kant's (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism

Kantian Review (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation that avoids the interpretative dilemma, though difficult questions about the argument remain.
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Archival date: 2018-12-03
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2018-12-03

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