Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism

Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):293-316 (2017)
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schopenhauer has been ignored in contemporary metaethics, and his commentators rarely attempt to analyze his metaethical views in contemporary terms. This is unfortunate. Schopenhauer has something important to teach us about moral realism.1I have both philosophical and interpretive aims in this paper. My philosophical aim is to show how Schopenhauer's views challenge the contemporary understanding of moral realism. The challenge arises from the fact that, while Schopenhauer's view implies that morality is "real" in a metaphysically- and epistemologically-robust sense, that view denies a central piece of the contemporary definition of moral realism: the cognitive (i.e....
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Moral Realism.Railton, Peter
Moral Anti-Realism.Joyce, Richard

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