Evidentialism and Social Epistemology

In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press (2024)
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Abstract

Traditionally, epistemology has been individualistic. Evidentialism fits squarely in this individualistic tradition. According to evidentialism, it is the mental states of the subject alone that fully determine what she is justified in believing. More recently, epistemology has become more and more social, moving away from this individualistic paradigm. Social epistemology examines the social nature of knowledge and rationality and thus engages in projects that are a departure from more traditional epistemology. It might be thought that social epistemology has no room for the evidentialist. In this paper, I argue that one can be an evidentialist as well as a thoroughgoing social epistemologist. In section 1, I explain individualistic epistemology and evidentialism. In section 2, I highlight some of the central projects of social epistemology. In section 3, I argue that none of the projects in section 2 are in conflict with evidentialism and that many can be fruitfully pursued from within an evidentialist framework. In sections 4 – 7, I examine and respond to two challenges to a successful evidentialist social epistemology. The first, inspired by Goldberg (2010), claims that evidentialism is ill-equipped to handle the insights regarding the epistemic importance of what is happening in the minds of others. The second, inspired by Lackey (2018), claims that evidentialism is unable to address a form of epistemic injustice. I show that both challenges can be met by the evidentialist.

Author's Profile

Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida

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