Defending Phenomenal Explanationism: Responses to Fumerton, Huemer, McAllister, Piazza, Steup, and Zhang

Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti

Asian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming) Copy BIBT_EX

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University of Alabama, Birmingham

University of Eastern Piedmont

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Archival date: 2024-10-01
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Categories

Abductive Replies to Skepticism in Epistemology

Dogmatism about Perception in Philosophy of Mind

Epistemological Theories in Epistemology

Inference to the Best Explanation, Misc in General Philosophy of Science

Perception and Skepticism in Philosophy of Mind

Perceptual Evidence in Philosophy of Mind

Perceptual Justification in Philosophy of Mind

Seemings in Epistemology

Keywords

phenomenal explanationism phenomenal conservatism seemings appearances explanationism Evidentialist

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