How to understand the knowledge norm of assertion: Reply to Schlöder

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):207-214 (2020)
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Abstract

Julian Schlöder (2018) examines Timothy Williamson's proposal that knowledge is the norm of assertion within the context of deontic logic. He argues for two claims, one concerning the formalisation of the thesis that knowledge is a norm of assertion and another concerning the formalisation of the thesis that knowledge is the only norm of assertion. On the basis of these claims, Schlöder goes on to raise a series of problems for Williamson's proposal. In response, I argue that both of Schlöder's claims can—and should—be rejected.

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Jonny McIntosh
St. Edmund Hall, Oxford

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