Perceptual principles as the basis for genuine judgments of beauty

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Abstract
This paper comments on an article by V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein (JCS,1999) in which they purport to be identifying the neurological principles of beauty. I draw attention to the way the problem of beauty is construed in the philosophical literature by Mary Mothersill (1984) and Immanuel Kant (Critique of Judgment). I argue that Ramachandran and Hirsteins' principles do not address the problem of beauty because they do not differentiate between the experience of beauty and other closely related phenomena. I then show how one might address the problem of beauty within the framework that they have adopted.
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MCMPPA-2
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Archival date: 2016-03-02
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