Three proposals regarding a theory of chance

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):281–307 (2005)
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Abstract
I argue that the theory of chance proposed by David Lewis has three problems: (i) it is time asymmetric in a manner incompatible with some of the chance theories of physics, (ii) it is incompatible with statistical mechanical chances, and (iii) the content of Lewis's Principal Principle depends on how admissibility is cashed out, but there is no agreement as to what admissible evidence should be. I proposes two modifications of Lewis's theory which resolve these difficulties. I conclude by tentatively proposing a third modification of Lewis's theory, one which explains many of the common features shared by the chance theories of physics.
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First archival date: 2009-09-13
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