Baseless Knowledge

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (50):211-231 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is a commonly held view in contemporary epistemology that for having knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief, although numerous different views exist about when a belief’s base is appropriate. Broadly speaking, they all share the view that one can only have knowledge if the belief’s base is in some sense truth-related or tracking the truth. Baseless knowledge can then be defi ned as knowledge where the belief is acquired and sustained in a way that does not track the truth. I will argue that rejecting baseless knowledge leads to controversial consequences. The problem increases if we consider contrasting persons who know because of appropriate belief forming processes but who fail to possess further epistemic virtues such as understanding. I will not argue which belief bases constitute a suffi cient condition for knowledge. Rather I will stress the point that the common assumption that an appropriate basing relation constitutes a necessary condition for knowledge has controversial consequences.
ISBN(s)
1333-1108
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MELBK-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-10-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-10-30

Total views
176 ( #39,585 of 71,429 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #36,803 of 71,429 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.