Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MERARA-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-05-25
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-05-21

Total views
71 ( #43,563 of 56,043 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #23,318 of 56,043 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.