Subjectivism and the Mental

Dialectica 70 (3):311-342 (2016)
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Abstract
This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony.
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Archival date: 2020-04-06
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References found in this work BETA
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Jackson, Frank
A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Cappelen, Herman & Hawthorne, John

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemology, Moral Philosophy and Optimism: A Comparative Analysis Between Managers and Their Subordinates.Rawwas, Mohammed Y. A.; Hammoud, Hadi Abdul-Rahman & Iyer, Karthik N. S.
Being Someone Else.Glazier, Martin

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2016-09-29

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