The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Wittgenstein and Searle

In Michael Starks (ed.), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Wittgenstein and Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 367p (2016). Las Vegas, USA: Michael Starks. pp. 11-69 (2016)
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Abstract
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I begin with ‘On Certainty’ and continue the analysis of recent writings by and about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and dual systems nomenclature.
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Archival date: 2016-04-04
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