Tolerating Sense Variation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):182-196 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Frege famously claimed that variations in the sense of a proper name can sometimes be ‘tolerated’. In this paper, we offer a novel explanation of this puzzling claim. Frege, we argue, follows Trendelenburg in holding that we think in language—sometimes individually and sometimes together. Variations in sense can be tolerated in just those cases where we are using language to coordinate our actions but are not engaged in thinking together about an issue.

Author Profiles

Eliot Michaelson
King's College London
Mark Textor
King's College London


Added to PP

216 (#60,687)

6 months
117 (#25,656)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?