Memory, Luck, and the Laudative Theory of Knowledge

Oxford Studies in Epistemology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

According to the laudative theory of knowledge, “knowledge” is a mere laudative term—a term, such as “athletic,” “artistic,” or “masterpiece,” that expresses merely that some entity is good relative to some domain. (I.e., the laudative theory claims that for you to know some proposition just is for you to believe some true proposition in a good way.) I defend the laudative theory by contrasting inferential knowledge and memory. A central component of what it is for an inferential belief to constitute knowledge is that the subject’s belief being true is due to the subject’s competent reasoning, rather than due to luck (i.e., inferential knowledge is incompatible with veritic luck). Conversely, I argue that many instances of successful memory are accurate due to luck, and that many such instances of successful memory nonetheless constitute (or provide a basis for) knowledge. If so, then there is some feature that is a central component of what it is for an inferential belief to constitute knowledge, but that is not even necessary for a memory (or memory-based belief) to constitute knowledge; and this fact suggests that, rather than picking out a substantive, unitary phenomenon, “knowledge” is a mere laudative term.

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Boyd Millar
Trent University

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