View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

175 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 175
Material to categorize
  1. Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - forthcoming - Rebus Press.
    An edited collection that systematically introduces epistemology, part of the Introduction to Philosophy open textbook series (edited by Christina Hendricks).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Chunglin Kwa, Styles of Knowing: A New History of Science From Ancient Times to the Present. [REVIEW]Sean F. Johnston - 2012 - Ambix 59:294-295.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Beware of Safety.Christian Piller - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):01-29.
    Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Stanowisko epistemologiczne Alvina Plantingi w sporze o naturę, funkcję i wartość uprawnienia epistemicznego / Alvin Plantinga’s Position in Epistemological Debate about the Nature, Function and the Value of the Epistemic Warrant.Marek A. Pepliński & Dariusz Łukasiewicz - 2018 - Filo-Sofija 41 (2):73-92.
    This article presents Alvin Plantinga’s views on epistemic justification. The first part situates Plantinga’s epistemological views in the context of his epistemology of religion and debates of general epistemology. The second part discusses Plantinga’s argument that the internalism of 20th century epistemology stems from deontologism and that the views on the epistemic justification of analytic philosophers reflect the relationship between classical deontologism and classical internalism. The last part points to the objections with which the Plantinga’s conception met and tries to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Enough is Enough: Austin on Knowing.Guy Longworth - 2018 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Oxford, UK: pp. 186–205.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Philosophie des modalités épistémiques (la logique assertorique revisitée).Fabien Schang - 2007 - Dissertation, Nancy Université
    The relevance of any logical analysis lies in its ability to solve paradoxes and trace conceptual troubles back; with this respect, the task of epistemic logic is to handle paradoxes in connection with the concept of knowledge. Epistemic logic is currently introduced as the logical analysis of crucial concepts within epistemology, namely: knowledge, belief, truth, and justification. An alternative approach will be advanced here in order to enlighten such a discourse, as centred upon the word assertion and displayed in terms (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Higher-Level Knowledge, Rational and Social Levels Constraints of the Common Model of the Mind.Antonio Lieto, William G. Kennedy, Christian Lebiere, Oscar Romero, Niels Taatgen & Robert West - forthcoming - Procedia Computer Science.
    In his famous 1982 paper, Allen Newell [22, 23] introduced the notion of knowledge level to indicate a level of analysis, and prediction, of the rational behavior of a cognitive arti cial agent. This analysis concerns the investigation about the availability of the agent knowledge, in order to pursue its own goals, and is based on the so-called Rationality Principle (an assumption according to which "an agent will use the knowledge it has of its environment to achieve its goals" [22, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples.Alex Davies - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):475-499.
    Infallibilism is commonly rejected because it is apparently subject to easy counter-examples. I describe a strategy that infallibilists can use to resist this objection. Because the sentences used in the counter-examples to express evidence and belief are context-sensitive, the infallibilist can insist that such counter-examples trade on a vacillation between different readings of these sentences. I describe what difficulties await those who try to produce counter-examples against which the proposed strategy is ineffective.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Meaning and Language.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):50-58.
    Meaning defines language because it is the internal function of language. At the same time, meaning does not exist unless in language and because of language. From the point of view of the speaking subject meaning is contents of conscience. From the point of view of a language, meaning is the objectification of knowledge in linguistic signs. And from the point of view of the individual speaking subject, meaning is the expressive intentional purpose to say something.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. The Objectivity of Local Knowledge. Lessons From Ethnobiology.David Ludwig - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4705-4720.
    This article develops an account of local epistemic practices on the basis of case studies from ethnobiology. I argue that current debates about objectivity often stand in the way of a more adequate understanding of local knowledge and ethnobiological practices in general. While local knowledge about the biological world often meets criteria for objectivity in philosophy of science, general debates about the objectivity of local knowledge can also obscure their unique epistemic features. In modification of Ian Hacking’s suggestion to discuss (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.
    I provide a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view I propose is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). I first refine my thesis in response to immediate objections. In subsequent sections I explain the various ways in which this thesis is theoretically superior to existing knowledge-first accounts of justification. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Friedrich Nietzsche's Flirt met Paradoxen en Chaos.Pouwel Slurink - 1992 - In Erik Heijerman & Winnie Wouters (eds.), Crisis van de rede. Perspectieven op cultuur. Assen, the Netherlands: van Gorcum. pp. 239-249.
    Lecture on Nietzsche's relativism and perspectivism given at a conference on the 'crisis of reason' in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, October 26, 1991. Nietzsche claims that truth does not exist and knowledge is not possible, because knowledge serves life and is bound to an organic position. In fact, this is a paradox that refutes itself. Knowledge has evolved precisely because organisms must have limited, perspectivistic knowledge of their environment from a subjective point of view. In science, subjectivity can even be transcended (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. On Ian Hacking’s Notion of Style of Reasoning.Luca Sciortino - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):243-264.
    The analytical notion of ‘scientific style of reasoning’, introduced by Ian Hacking in the middle of the 1980s, has become widespread in the literature of the history and philosophy of science. However, scholars have rarely made explicit the philosophical assumptions and the research objectives underlying the notion of style: what are its philosophical roots? How does the notion of style fit into the area of research of historical epistemology? What does a comparison between Hacking’s project on styles of thinking and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  14. Conceptual Therapy: An Introduction to Framework-Relative Epistemology.Bartlett Steven James - 1983, 2014 - St. Louis, MO, USA: Studies in Theory and Behavior.
    Conceptual therapy seeks to eliminate from our vocabulary of concepts those that are conceptually pathological. The very use of such concepts—which is much of the time—brings about dysfunctional thinking: thought, that is to say, that leads us astray, paving the way for beliefs and claims to knowledge that are fundamentally nonsensical. A therapy for such concepts may be likened to holding a selective sieve and pouring the ideas with which we attempt to make sense of the world through it, allowing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Skill in Epistemology II: Skill and Know How.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.
    The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how (§1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stand together (§4-5).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  16. Knowledge and Normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. Bloomsbury Academic.
    Abstract: On the standard story about knowledge, knowledge has a normative dimension by virtue of the fact that knowledge involves justification. On the standard story, justification is necessary but insufficient for knowledge. The additional conditions that distinguish knowledge from justified belief are normatively insignificant. In this chapter we will consider whether the concept of knowledge might be irrelevant to normative questions in epistemology. Some proponents of the standard story might think that it is, but we shall see that the concept (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. From Parmenidean Identity to Beyond Classical Idealism and Epistemic Constructivism.Dimitris Kilakos - 2016 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 48 (2):75-86.
    Rockmore’s paper offers a nice discussion on how classical German idealism provides a plausible account of the Parmenidean insight that thought and being are identical and suggests that idealist epistemic constructivism is arguably the most promising approach to cognition. In this short commentary, I will explore the implications of adopting other interpretations of Parmenidean identity thesis, which arguably lead to different conclusions than the ones drawn by Rockmore. En route to disavow the distinction between ontology and epistemology, I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism.Fabio Sterpetti - 2006 - In Lorenzo Magnani & Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Springer. pp. 639-661.
    Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge.Mariano L. Bianca & P. Piccari - 2015 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Some Thoughts About Aquinas's Conception of Truth as Adequation.Liran Shia Gordon - 2016 - Heythrop Journal 57 (2):325-336.
    While Aquinas’s primary notion of truth as adequation is applied to God and man in somewhat different ways, it is apparent that it is not applicable to the angels, at least not in the same way. However, since truth is a transcendental, and as transcendentals are convertible, one may claim that the transcendental systems that apply to various beings differ. In order to consolidate the universality of the transcendental system, the study aims to show the manner truth as adequation can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21. Reason Dethroned; Knowledge Regained.James Arthur Moore - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Hume held that we have no rational justification for our inductive beliefs. A more radical view is that we have no rational justification for any of our beliefs. This dissertation has two goals pertaining to this more radical view. // The first goal is to find a basis for constructive epistemology that is consistent with this view. This goal is first sought by considering externalist theories of knowledge since these do not require rational justification for knowledge. Externalist theories are defended (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Realism, Science, and Pragmatism.Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.) - 2014 - Routledge.
    This collection of original essays aims to reinvigorate the debate surrounding philosophical realism in relation to philosophy of science, pragmatism, epistemology, and theory of perception. Questions concerning realism are as current and as ancient as philosophy itself; this volume explores relations between different positions designated as ‘realism’ by examining specific cases in point, drawn from a broad range of systematic problems and historical views, from ancient Greek philosophy through the present. The first section examines the context of the project; contributions (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.John Turri & Ori Friedman - forthcoming - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. London, United Kingdom: pp. 45-69.
    We conducted five experiments that reveal some main contours of the folk epistemology of lotteries. The folk tend to think that you don't know that your lottery ticket lost, based on the long odds ("statistical cases"); by contrast, the folk tend to think that you do know that your lottery ticket lost, based on a news report ("testimonial cases"). We evaluate three previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in statistical cases: the justification account, the chance account, and the statistical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  24. Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
    Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  25. On the General Form of the Grue Paradox.Chaohui Zhuang - manuscript
    The grue paradox, also called the new riddle of induction, posed a great challenge to the common understanding about induction. This paper shows that there is a close relation between the grue paradox and the problem of conditionals. This paper presents a general form of the grue predicate. Based on the general form, this paper argues that this kind of predicates can not be used for induction and prediction.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Causal Theory of Knowledge
  1. Hegelian Self-Consciousness or the Necessity of the Other.Gabriel Leiva - manuscript
    Abstract -/- The objective of this article is to understand, in the Phenomenology of the spirit, how the dialectical movement that occurs in consciousness takes place as soon as it is recognized as self-consciousness. For this, it is of vital importance to re-visit the first whole movement that makes consciousness, in Phenomenology, in order to understand how it is capable of recognizing itself as a self-consciousness. -/- .
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Review of John Woods, Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic. [REVIEW]Gilbert Plumer - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (1):147-156.
    This article reviews John Wood’s Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology.Christian Coseru - 2013 - In Steven Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. West Sussex, UKL: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. pp. 241–255.
    Among the key factors that play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, Buddhist philosophers list (i) the testimony of sense experience, (ii) introspective awareness (iii) inferences drawn from these directs modes of acquaintance, and (iv) some version of coherentism, so as guarantee that truth claims remains consistent across a diverse philosophical corpus. This paper argues that when Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order to advance a range of empirical and introspective claims. As a result, reasoning, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don’t know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it’s impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it’s impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it’s impossible (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Review of Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2007)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 337-347.
    Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination is but icing on unconscious machinations), but as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has recently noted, is a radical new epistemology and the foundation for all description (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 403p (2000)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 328-336.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as confused as nearly all the other commentary on W (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Epistemology and Information.Dretske Fred - 2008 - In Pieter Adriaans & Johan Van Benthem (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 8. Philosophy of Information. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier-North Holland. pp. 29-47.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Possible Worlds, Zombies, and Truth Machines.Mirza Mehmedovic - 2016 - Giornale di Metafisica 1:262-283.
    The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other logical consideration to prove that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Ethics and the Nature of Action.Heine A. Holmen - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Oslo
    The following thesis starts from the question «why be moral?» and adresses an action-theoretic strategy for answering this question in the positive by reference to the constitutive natur of actions. In these debates, the epistemology of action has turned into a central issue. The thesis adresses these debates and develops a novel account of the epistemology: an account that may well turn out to provide a ground for the aforementioned constitutivist strategies.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Evidence of Falsehood.Timothy R. O'Donnell - manuscript
    It has been largely assumed from the start that truth, the first premise of the Tripartite theory of Knowledge, is necessary for a mental state of knowing. And this has intuitively made sense. Examples that demonstrate the logic of this premise are wide-spread and easily found. Yet, if one tries to establish the necessity of this condition for oneself, one may discover, a logical flaw in this premise. In theory truth is necessary, however, in practice it is not truth that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains.Neil McDonnell - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
    Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Implication of the Precision of SPRs. Joshua - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Prudent Conscience View.Brian Besong - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):127-141.
    Moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral seemings are justification-conferring, has become an increasingly popular account in moral epistemology. Defenses of the position have largely focused on the standard account, according to which the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming is determined by its phenomenal credentials alone. Unfortunately, the standard account is a less plausible version of moral intuitionism because it does not take etiology seriously. In this paper, I provide an outline and defense of a non-standard account of moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Marketing and Logical Deduction.R. Skipper & M. R. Hyman - forthcoming - Journal of Marketing:89--92.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Sensorimotor Process with Constraint Satisfaction. Grounding of Meaning (EUCogII 2009).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    There is an increasing agreement in the cognitive sciences community that our sensations are closely related to our actions. Our actions impact our sensations from the environment and the knowledge we have of it. Cognition is grounded in sensori-motor coordination. In the perspective of implementing such a performance in artificial systems, there is a need for a model of sensori-motor coordination. We propose here such a model as based on the generation of meaningful information by a system submitted to a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge
  1. Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don’t know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it’s impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it’s impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it’s impossible (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Another Cartoon Portrait of the Mind From the Reductionist Metaphysicians--A Review of Peter Carruthers ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2011) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 236-264.
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life, but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation.David M. Godden & Douglas N. Walton - 2007 - Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  5. Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges.John Nicholas Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):83-94.
    I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false.I will show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsuccessfully) to address, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75-81.
    John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  8. Is Perception Inferential?William Cornwell - 2004 - In Johan Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Niederosterreichkultur. pp. 80-82.
    Applying a theory of psychological modularity, I argue for a theory of defeasibility conditions for the epistemic justification of perceptual beliefs. My theory avoids the extremes of holism (e.g., coherentism and confirmation holism) and of foundationalist theories of non-inferential justification.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Primitivism about Knowledge
  1. The Neural and Cognitive Mechanisms of Knowledge Attribution: An EEG Study.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Cognition 203:104412.
    Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Epistemic Territory.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 175