Thinking with Sensations

Journal of Philosophy 114 (3):134-154 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by perceivers; while, the dual component theory cannot do justice to the important role that sensory phenomenology plays in our perceptual awareness of physical objects. I argue that in order to avoid the difficulties with each of the standard alternatives, we must characterize sensory phenomenology as functioning in the way that linguistic symbols function in thought.
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MILTWS-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-04-22
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-08-10

Total views
196 ( #32,731 of 65,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #26,340 of 65,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.