The Event of Primary Experience and Philosophy. Metatheory of Experience in Kant and Quine’s Epistemologies

Sententiae 33 (2):64-74 (2015)
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Abstract
The author argues that Quine’s criticism of Kantian analytical/synthetic distinction, as well as transcendentalist reductionism, is not entirely adequate. Furthermore, the author states that Kant’s and Quine’s theories of experience and cognition (transcendentalist and holistic) are based on a common dogma, the one of consistency. Taking into account their uncritical ac-ceptance of experience as a system that is able to adjust new and old elements to each other, both philosophers have much more in common than Quine and his followers might have ex- pected.
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