Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-defeat

Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110 (2014)
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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC, then Huemer’s Self-Defeat argument doesn’t uniquely motivate PC.
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MIZPCJ
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-03-16
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References found in this work BETA
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
Evidentialism.Feldman, Richard & Conee, Earl

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2014-03-16

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