Chapter 6: Reifying Terms

In Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract
This chapter develops a semantics for 'reifying terms' of the sort 'the proposition that S', 'the fact that S', 'the property of being P', 'the number eight', 'the concept horse', 'the truth value true', 'the kind humane being'. This semantics is developed within the broader perspective of the ontology of natural language involving abstract objects only at its periphery, not its core.
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