Overlap: On the Relation Between Perceiving and Believing

Synthese 203 (6):1-15 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that mental types can overlap. That is, one token mental state can be multiple types. In particular, I argue that a perceptual experience can simultaneously be a belief. This does not imply that belief and experience are type-identical, they merely share some of their tokens. When a subject perceives with content _p_, that content is usually accessible to the subject. By endorsing _p_, whether automatically or consciously, the subject comes to believe that _p_. In this instance, the perceptual experience, while retaining its content and phenomenology, becomes a belief. The possibility of this kind of overlap turns out to have epistemic benefits, especially in the face of arguments by Alex Byrne and Kathrin Glüer. I consider several objections to overlap, including the idea that perception and belief have different kinds of content, that beliefs tend to outlast experiences and differences in phenomenology.

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Auke Montessori
Washington University in St. Louis

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