Credence: A Belief-First Approach

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669 (2020)
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Abstract
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed.
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2020
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MOOCAB-3
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First archival date: 2020-02-23
Latest version: 6 (2020-06-24)
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2020-02-23

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