Epistemic Emotions

In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--399 (2010)
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Abstract
I discuss a large number of emotions that are relevant to performance at epistemic tasks. My central concern is the possibility that it is not the emotions that are most relevant to success of these tasks but associated virtues. I present cases in which it does seem to be the emotions rather than the virtues that are doing the work. I end of the paper by mentioning the connections between desirable and undesirable epistemic emotions.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Moral Anxiety and Moral Agency.Charlie Kurth - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5:171-195.

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