Abstract

Permissivism is the claim that more than one doxastic attitude towards a proposition can at least sometimes be justified by the same total body of evidence. Impermissivism, the negation of Permissivism, is commonly taken to involve evidentialist assumptions. The only versions of Permissivism consistent with evidentialist assumptions are those which combine coarse-grained accounts of doxastic attitudes with fine-grained accounts of evidential support, as with Blake Roeber’s equipollent cases or vice-versa with fine-grained accounts of doxastic attitudes combined with coarse-grained accounts of evidential support as with Thomas Kelly’s Intuitive Credal Permissivism (ICP). This paper argues that such mismatches in granularity are not justified. I address various motivations for mismatched granularities and show in each case that the argument for the mismatch does not succeed. If these arguments succeed, Permissive views consistent with certain evidentialist assumptions are not tenable.