Experimental evidence that knowledge entails justification

In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, volume 4. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A standard view in philosophy is that knowledge entails justification. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. We argue that this admirable and striking research suffers from an important limitation: participants were asked about knowledge but not justification. Thus it is possible that people attributed knowledge partly because they thought the belief was justified. Perhaps though, if given the opportunity, people would deny justification while still attributing knowledge. It is also possible that earlier findings were due to perspective taking. This paper reports further research that directly addresses these questions. Our findings support the hypothesis that knowledge entails justification on the ordinary view.

Author Profiles

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-28

Downloads
419 (#35,263)

6 months
86 (#42,298)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?