Natural-born determinists: a new defense of causation as probability-raising

Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1-20 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
395 ( #12,109 of 53,540 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #42,315 of 53,540 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.