Natural-born determinists: a new defense of causation as probability-raising

Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1-20 (2010)
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A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.
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Philosophical Papers.Lewis, David K.
Causation, Prediction, and Search.Spirtes, Peter; Glymour, Clark & Scheines, Richard

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Degree of Explanation.Northcott, Robert

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