Natural-born determinists: a new defense of causation as probability-raising

Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1-20 (2010)
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A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.

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Robert Northcott
Birkbeck, University of London


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