Hegel’s Phenomenology and the Question of Semantic Pragmatism

The Owl of Minerva 38 (1/2):127-143 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper criticizes the assumptions behind Robert Brandom’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, contending that Hegel’s concern with the rational structure of experience, his valorization of reflection over ordinary experience and his idea of the necessit y of progress in knowledge cannot be accommodated within the framework of semantic pragmatism. The central contentions are that Brandom’s pragmatism never comes to terms with Hegel’s idea of truth as a result, leading to a historicist distortion, and also that Brandom’s failure to deal with Hegel’s distinction between natural consciousness and the phenomenological observer collapses Hegel’s phenomenology into a philosophy restricted to the level of natural consciousness.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-05-30
Latest version: 1 (2019-05-30)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
264 ( #22,993 of 2,439,598 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
60 ( #11,059 of 2,439,598 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.