Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394 (2015)
Abstract
Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1080/00048402.2014.1001415
Analytics
Added to PP
2015-02-03
Downloads
608 (#13,802)
6 months
43 (#30,738)
2015-02-03
Downloads
608 (#13,802)
6 months
43 (#30,738)
Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?