Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394 (2015)
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Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

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Luis R. G. Oliveira
University of Houston


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