Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Author's Profile

Luis R. G. Oliveira
University of Houston

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-03

Downloads
608 (#13,802)

6 months
43 (#30,738)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?