Pain and Space: The Middle Wittgenstein, the Early Merleau-Ponty

In Oskari Kuusela, Mihai Ometita & Timur Ucan (eds.), Wittgenstein and Phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 141-160 (2018)
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Abstract

The paper identifies in Cartesian dualism a common target of the middle Wittgenstein and the early Merleau-Ponty. By relegating pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, Cartesian dualism renders common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to do justice to common localizations of pain illuminate one another. In their light, Cartesian dualism involves an objectification and a deappropriation of one’s body. Further, Wittgenstein’s acknowledgment of a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. tactile space, feeling space) restores the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not a continuation of the physical space of things.

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Mihai Ometiță
ICUB-Humanities, Research Institute of The University of Bucharest

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