Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Ought-To-Bes of Perceptual Cognition

In Vojtěch Kolman Ondřej Beran (ed.), From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism. New York: Routledge. pp. 308–22 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract: Any normative inferentialist view confronts a set of challenges in the form of how to account for the sort of ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary that is involved, paradigmatically, in our noninferential perceptual responses and knowledge claims. This chapter lays out that challenge, and then argues that Sellars’ original multilayered account of such noninferential responses in the context of his normative inferentialist semantics and epistemology shows how the inferentialist can plausibly handle those sorts of cases without stretching the notion of inference beyond its standard uses. Finally, it is suggested that for Sellars there were deeply naturalistic motivations for his own normative inferentialism, though the latter raises further questions as to whether this really represents, as Sellars thought, a genuinely scientific naturalist outlook on meaning and conceptual cognition.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-07-13
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
65 ( #47,002 of 58,351 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #21,902 of 58,351 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.