How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96 (2019)
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Abstract
While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of hypothesis.
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First archival date: 2018-06-03
Latest version: 2 (2018-11-22)
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Higher Order Evidence.Christensen, David
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.

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