In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative

Axiomathes 28 (4):435-446 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Sample (2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In sum, philosophers ought to impose on scientists only an epistemic standard that they are willing to impose on themselves.
Reprint years
2018
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PARIDO-4
Upload history
First archival date: 2018-03-03
Latest version: 2 (2018-03-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-03-03

Total views
343 ( #20,332 of 65,694 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #38,082 of 65,694 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.