What should the Bayesian do when their awareness grows?

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Abstract
Bayesians have a well-developed account of how you should change your credences when you learn new evidence; that is, when your body of evidence grows. What's more, they have a range of epistemic and pragmatic arguments that support that account. But they do not have a satisfactory account of when and how you should change your credences when you become aware of new possibilities; that is, when your awareness grows. In this paper, I consider each of the arguments for the Bayesian's account of how respond to evidence, and I ask whether they can generate a Bayesian account of how to respond to awareness growth. I argue that, with one exception, they can't. I conclude that our credal response to awareness growth is considerably less rigorously constrained than our credal response to new evidence.
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PETWST-2
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Archival date: 2021-11-18
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2021-11-18

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