Przemowa Demiurga w Platońskim „Timajosie” a współczesne pojęcie godności [Demiurge’s Speech in Plato’s “Timaeus” and the Contemporary Concept of Dignity]

In Antoni Dębiński (ed.), Abiit, non obiit. Księga poświęcona pamięci Księdza Profesora Antoniego Kościa SVD. Wydawnictwo KUL. pp. 655-665 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Today, dignity recognized as a fundamental value across legal systems is equal, inherent and inalienable, inviolable, is the source of human rights and is essential for its subject to be recognized as an autotelic entity (an end in itself) that cannot be treated as an object. The analysis of the extract from Plato’s Demiurge’s speech in Timaeus reveals that Plato developed a reflection on something that determines the qualitative difference between certain beings and the world of things, and that forms the basis for the special treatment of these beings, which the modern language can reasonably describe as dignity. The attributes of that dignity seem to overlap with the nature of dignity as we know today. What is more, Plato proposes a response to the question of what dignity is like but also to the question of what dignity is. It is the existential perfection, established in a perfect way of existence based on a specific internal unity of being. As the existential perfection, it covers the entire being along with all its features; it is inseparable from being (inherent and inalienable) – without it, it cannot exist. It is primordial to the particular features and independent of their acquisition or loss. Plato’s approach allows, based on the approach to dignity, the formulation of proposals aligned with today’s personalistic standards prescribing that persons be treated as ends in themselves and prohibiting the treatment of persons like objects.

Author's Profile

Marek Piechowiak
SWPS University Of Social Sciences And Humanities


Added to PP

457 (#24,747)

6 months
42 (#48,567)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?